Who was that masked man? Online defamation, freedom of expression, and the right to speak anonymously by Feasby, Jonathon T.
Canadian Journal of Law and Technology 
Volume 1 Number 1 Article 2 
1-1-2002 
Who was that masked man? Online defamation, freedom of 
expression, and the right to speak anonymously 
Jonathon T. Feasby 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/cjlt 
 Part of the Computer Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, Internet Law Commons, 
Privacy Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jonathon T. Feasby, "Who was that masked man? Online defamation, freedom of expression, and the right 
to speak anonymously" (2002) 1:1 CJLT. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Canadian Journal of Law and Technology by an authorized editor of Schulich Law 
Scholars. For more information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca. 
CJLT
Canadian Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 1 No. 1
http://cjlt.dal.ca
Who was that masked man? Online defamation, freedom of 
expression, and the right to speak anonymously
Jonathon T. Feasby*
Introduction
As the internet continues to reach into the lives of people around the world, it facilitates interaction 
and the exchange of ideas between far-flung individuals and groups to an extent unprecedented in 
communications history. However, with this positive effect, the potential of the internet as a forum 
for defamation and other malfeasance has increased as well. Words online can be heard or read in 
places conventional forms of speech might never reach. As the United States Supreme Court put it, 
with the aid of the internet ". . . any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice 
that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox."1 The internet's capacity to carry words afar 
greatly increases the damage possible from a single incident of defamatory speech.
An additional factor contributes to the potential of the internet as both a socially constructive 
"marketplace of ideas" and an ideal medium for the transmission of defamatory speech: the internet 
is a world of anonymity.2 Users are often identified only by an email address or chat room 
pseudonym of their own choosing. These identities are simple to obtain under false pretences and 
without identification.3
Anonymity can be an aid to nefarious enterprise, as it was for Jesse James and other masked 
bandits. It is attractive to those who wish to utter defamatory statements because it removes 
accountability. However, anonymity can also be a positive social force. The Lone Ranger wore a 
mask as well. Anonymity can allow advocacy in favour of unpopular causes, or advocacy by 
unpopular people. It can allow participation in public debate by those who would otherwise remain 
quiet out of fear of persecution, loss of status or social ostracism.4
True historical figures have also used anonymity in the service of constructive ends. James Madison, 
Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, who lobbied for the ratification of the United States Constitution, 
published their essays under a shared pseudonym.5 Joseph Howe's 1835 publication of an 
anonymous letter critical of the corrupt magistrates of Halifax and his subsequent libel trial provide a 
Canadian example.6
While obviously subject to abuses, anonymity is a potentially positive social force, and there appears 
to be no reason why it should be attributed a different value in the online context. The law governing 
the internet must therefore balance the protection of anonymity as a means of facilitating 
expression, debate and political participation with its negative potential as a cloak for shielding bad 
behaviour from view.
Canadian jurisprudence on the subject of anonymity is scarce, and scarcer still in the context of the 
internet. While the issue is now regularly making headlines in the United States,7 and is being 
litigated there with increasing frequency,8 it has yet to make the same impact in Canada. However, 
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the factors that make the internet a potential hotbed of defamatory speech, or "cyberlibel" (ie., 
anonymity and access to large numbers of people) are not unique to the United States. The internet 
is by definition an international medium, so what is now the norm in the United States cannot be 
long in heading north.
One particular scenario is common in the U.S. cases: A person believes he or she has been the 
subject of defamatory speech online by someone using a pseudonym. The aggrieved party is unsure 
of whom to sue, so he or she files suit against the anonymous party and requests discovery of the 
internet service provider (I.S.P.) to disclose who uttered the speech.
While I.S.P.s in the past have often simply turned over the information when they received a 
subpoena, some major providers have begun giving notice to the client whose identity is being 
sought.9 This gives defendants an opportunity to apply to have the subpoena quashed, and has 
resulted in more frequent litigation of whether there is a right to speak anonymously online.
The issues of whether and how it is appropriate to divulge the identities of those who choose to 
speak anonymously raise essential questions about democratic participation and freedom of 
expression. Unfortunately, Canadian law has not considered these issues in much depth. Courts 
must decide where to place the threshold for divulging the identity of anonymous defamation 
defendants. The answer to this question will require a careful balance between the interests of 
plaintiffs in having their grievances heard and reputations preserved and the value of anonymity as 
an aspect of freedom of expression. American case law on the subject considers these issues and 
provides some useful first principles that arguably apply with equal force outside of the American 
constitutional context.
Despite this, and the fact that the American constitutional law includes a right to speak 
anonymously,10 American and Canadian courts have not decided the cases in a way that fully 
acknowledges the value of anonymous speech on the internet. However, a procedure that fully 
balances the value of anonymous speech with the need to give injured parties redress can be 
extrapolated from consideration of the available American and Canadian case law. I will argue that 
such a procedure should be employed in applications to divulge the identities of anonymous 
defendants in Canada. Further, in considering such applications, Canadian courts should find that the 
guarantee of freedom of expression in s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms11 
includes a right to speak anonymously.
Anonymous Defendants in Canada
Two recent cases indicate that anonymity on the internet is becoming a live issue in Canadian law. 
Philip Services Corp. v. John Does12 and Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Joe Doe13 both consider requests by 
plaintiffs for court orders compelling Internet Service Providers to identify internet users.
Unfortunately, Philip Services Corp. provides no reasons for the decision and is merely an order to 
the I.S.P. to answer interrogatories identifying the anonymous defendants. However, in Irwin Toy 
Justice Wilkins acknowledges that the case is one of the first on an issue that will become 
increasingly common,14 and provides reasons that briefly address some of the procedural and policy 
concerns surrounding the issue of online anonymity.
    Irwin Toy v. Joe Doe
As an unpublished decision of a lower court, Irwin Toy has limited weight as precedent. However, it 
represents the totality of Canadian law on the procedure for identifying anonymous online 
defendants, so it is definitive by default.
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In Irwin Toy, the plaintiff corporation and its president alleged that the anonymous defendant had 
sent a defamatory email message containing confidential files that had been wrongfully removed 
from the corporation. The defendant was known only by an email address, which was traced to an 
Internet Service Provider. The plaintiffs sought production of material identifying the defendant and 
discovery of the I.S.P.
The decision in Irwin Toy applies the normal tests in Rules 30.10 and 31.10 of the Ontario Rules of 
Civil Procedure,15 which deal with production from and discovery of non-parties. However, to 
prevent the abuse of the procedure through frivolous suits brought only to disclose the identity of 
anonymous internet users, the court also required that the plaintiffs show a prima facie case against 
the defendant on the allegations made.16
Under Rule 31.10, the moving party must satisfy the court that it has been unable to obtain the 
information from other persons it is entitled to examine for discovery. It must further show that it 
would be unfair to require the moving party to proceed to trial without having the opportunity of 
examining the person. Rule 30.10 allows for production of a document to the court if it is satisfied 
that the document is relevant to a material issue, and also repeats the fairness criterion of Rule 
31.10.
The moving party in Irwin Toy passed the tests under Rules 31.10 and 30.10. With respect to the 
first element of Rule 31.10, Justice Wilkins noted that in cases with similar facts it would be difficult 
to imagine a scenario where the information could be obtained from a source other than the I.S.P.17 
He further stated that the identity of the defendant would always be of sufficient importance to 
require disclosure.18 However, he continued,
Such disclosure, . . . in my view, should not be automatic upon the issuance of a 
Statement of Claim. If such were to be the case, the fact of the anonymity of the 
internet could be shattered for the price of the issuance of a spurious Statement of 
Claim, and the benefits obtained by the anonymity lost in inappropriate 
circumstances.19
For this reason, where defendants have chosen to remain anonymous, the moving party should have 
to show that it has a prima facie case against the John Doe defendant before his or her identity will 
be divulged.20
Is There a Charter Right to Speak Anonymously in Canada?
The decision in Irwin Toy takes some steps to protect anonymity on the internet. As Justice Wilkins 
indicated,
. . . some degree of privacy or confidentiality with respect to the identity of the 
internet protocol address of the originator of a message has significant safety value 
and is in keeping with... good public policy.21
However, since the case was undefended, the question of the application of the Charter to the issue 
of anonymity was not raised, and so could not be considered by the court.22 The basis of the 
constitutional right to speak anonymously in the United States will be addressed in depth below. 
However, before proceeding with the discussion in the Canadian context, it is first necessary to 
address the question of whether the Charter would apply in a scenario such as that in Irwin Toy. It is 
submitted that the Charter would apply to a review of the Civil Procedure Rules under which the 
order for production was made.
    The Application of the Charter
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Section 32 of the Charter indicates that the Charter applies to the federal parliament and 
government, as well as the provincial legislatures in respect of all matters within their 
competence.23
In R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd.,24 the Supreme Court held that the word "government" in s. 
32 did not apply to the courts, and that an order of a court was thus not subject to review under s. 
2(b).25 This appears to leave no room for Charter review of an order for production in a case like 
Irwin Toy. However, Dolphin Delivery may be distinguished from the situation at issue in such cases. 
Peter Hogg explains Dolphin Delivery in this way:
No government was involved in the dispute, and no statute applied to the dispute. 
Therefore there was no governmental action that could make the Charter 
applicable.26
Despite this, he writes,
Where . . . a court order is issued . . . in a purely private proceeding that is governed 
by statute law, then the Charter will apply to the court order.27
An order for production and discovery from a non-party in a civil proceeding must be made pursuant 
to the Rules of Civil Procedure, which in Ontario, are regulations of the Courts of Justice Act.28 Such 
an order is not made under common law authority. As a result, the aspect of the proceeding relating 
to the order is properly described as "governed by statute law" and is therefore arguably subject to 
Charter review.
However, even barring a finding that such a court order is "governed by statute law," Charter values 
may apply nonetheless. The Supreme Court of Canada has found that although the Charter does not 
directly apply to the common law, the principles of the common law ". . . ought to develop in a 
manner consistent with the fundamental values enshrined in the Constitution."29 It is thus clear that 
Charter values should be taken into account by courts considering orders for the production or 
discovery of the names of anonymous defendants.
    The Right to Speak Anonymously
Canada does not have a highly developed Charter jurisprudence on the issue of anonymity. While 
the constitutionality of plaintiffs bringing actions under pseudonyms for the purpose of maintaining 
their own privacy has been considered,30 no Canadian court has engaged the constitutional issues 
involved in unmasking defendants whose identities are unknown.
American case law on the right to speak anonymously, as will be shown, is an outgrowth of the 
guarantee of freedom of speech in the First Amendment of the U.S. Bill of Rights.31 In Canada, s. 
2(b) of the Charter grants the fundamental freedom of,
. . . thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other 
media of communication; . . .
This provision formally protects a very broad range of activity, particularly in the use of the word 
"expression," rather than "speech." 32 However, unlike its American counterpart, and despite its 
more general wording, it has never been said that s. 2(b) includes a right to speak anonymously.
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Perhaps the closest the Supreme Court of Canada has come to finding such a right was in R.J.R.-
MacDonald v. Canada, where it found that, ". . . freedom of expression necessarily entails the right 
to say nothing or the right not to say certain things."33 This statement is similar to one of the 
American arguments for a right to speak anonymously, which holds that a person's name is like any 
other element of a text, and may be omitted or included at the discretion of the author.34 However, 
somewhat ironically, this statement was made in the context of the Supreme Court striking down a 
law requiring tobacco manufacturers to include health warnings on cigarette packages on the basis 
that the warnings were not attributed and might be taken as the speech of the cigarette company.
Although s. 2(b) has not explicitly been interpreted as protecting the anonymity of expression, there 
is jurisprudence that considers the existence of a right to privacy in an overall sense, not limited to 
the context of the internet. Decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, such as R. v. O'Connor35 and 
Canada (Combines Investigation Acts, Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc.,36 
indicate that Canadians may have such a right under s. 7 or s. 8 of the Charter. However, much of 
the law of privacy under the Charter has evolved in the context of balancing state and individual 
interests. Such a scenario provides a poor analogy to the interests at stake in the unmasking of a 
defendant through discovery in a civil action between private parties. Consequently, the Charter 
arguments for a right to privacy do not translate well to the context of anonymity in civil 
proceedings.
The Alberta Queen's Bench case of R. v. Weir,37 a child pornography decision, provides a brief 
example. The case is topical in that it considers the expectation of privacy in email messages. The 
Court found that email messages carry a "reasonable expectation of privacy" as they pass through 
the computer system at the I.S.P.38 While the expectation of privacy was found to be somewhat 
lower than that of first class conventional mail,39 the court indicated that searches will not usually 
be allowed without judicial authorization.40 It seems logical that a similar expectation would apply to 
other information that the I.S.P. holds as a result of its relationship with the client, such as billing 
information and the client's name and address. Despite this, and the fact that the I.S.P. divulged the 
client's identity in response to a police request before any warrant was issued, there is no discussion 
of the Charter issues surrounding the defendant's right to remain anonymous.
However, the issues in Weir are considered in the context of illegal search and seizure in the 
investigation of a criminal charge under s. 8 of the Charter. The case does not relate to freedom of 
expression, which grounds the more direct arguments in favour of a right to anonymity. Still, Weir41 
arguably bestows some protection on information held by I.S.P.s on behalf of their clients.
Privacy cases involving Charter protections of physical liberty and security of the person or freedom 
from unreasonable search and seizure are a forced fit to the context of a civil dispute over the 
identity of a party in a defamation case. Freedom of expression and basic democratic principles allow 
for much stronger arguments in favour of a right to speak anonymously.
The First Amendment and the Right to Speak Anonymously in 
the United States
The decision in Irwin Toy, discussed above, addresses some of the unique legal issues with the 
problem of identifying anonymous defendants in cases involving the internet. American case law, 
considered in the context of a well-defined constitutional right to speak anonymously, provides some 
additional procedural protections to the anonymous internet defendant, as well as addressing the 
essential democratic issues involved with anonymity online.
The American jurisprudence creating a right to speak anonymously is rooted in the guarantee of 




Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a 
redress of their grievances.42
The right to anonymity is a function of freedom of association,43 which is a right implied from the 
explicit guarantees of free expression in the First Amendment.44 Anonymity reduces the possibility 
of identification and fear of reprisal for those engaging in legitimate, but unpopular speech.45
The most frequently quoted decisions on the right to anonymity as an aspect of the First Amendment 
guarantee of freedom of speech are those of the United States Supreme Court in Talley, supra, and 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission.46
In Talley, the earlier of the two cases, the Court cited the First Amendment in overruling a statute 
banning the distribution of anonymous handbills. In reaching its conclusion, the Court reviewed the 
historic basis of the right to anonymity:
Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures, and even books have played an 
important role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted groups and sects from time to 
time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws 
either anonymously or not at all.47
In McIntyre, the Court approvingly quoted the above passage, and added,
Anonymity . . . provides a way for a writer who may be personally unpopular to 
ensure that readers will not prejudge her message simply because they do not like 
its proponent. . . . The specific holding in Talley related to advocacy of an economic 
boycott, but the Court's reasoning embraced a respected tradition of anonymity in 
the advocacy of political causes. This tradition is perhaps best exemplified by the 
secret ballot, the hard-won right to vote one's conscience without fear of 
retaliation.48
While these words indicate that the Court felt that the right to anonymous speech is a value that 
should be jealously guarded, it should also be noted that both Talley and McIntyre created specific 
exceptions within the broad constitutional protections they afforded. In McIntyre the Court reviewed 
the intended scope of its ruling in Talley:
California had defended the Los Angeles ordinance at issue in Talley as a law "aimed 
at providing a way to identify those responsible for fraud, false advertising and libel." 
We rejected that argument because nothing in the text or legislative history of the 
ordinance limited its application to those evils... We then made clear that we did "not 
pass on the validity of an ordinance to prevent these or any other supposed evils."49
Although the law challenged in McIntyre raised additional constitutional issues not present in Talley, 
the Court found that,
. . . to the extent. . . that Ohio seeks to justify [the impugned statute] as a means to 
prevent the dissemination of untruths, its defense must fail for the same reason 
given in Talley.50
Though pointedly not ruling on the issue, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Talley 
and McIntyre demonstrate the clear reluctance of the Court to grant the same First Amendment 
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protection to anonymity in the context of an action concerning libel, fraud or false advertising as in 
the context of speech generally, and political and social activism specifically. It is clear that while the 
Court often sees anonymity as a constructive position, deserving of protection, it did not intend to 
create a precedent that facilitated the abuse of anonymity.
The remaining question, then, is whether the existing constitutional protections of anonymous 
speech will translate into cyberspace.
First Amendment Anonymity on the Internet
In A.C.L.U. v. Reno,51 the United States Supreme Court invoked the First Amendment in overruling 
provisions of the Communications Decency Act that limited the transmission of "indecent"52 and 
"patently offensive"53 material to people over the age of 18. In reaching its decision, the court 
famously gushed about the value and political potential of the online medium, referring to the ". . . 
vast democratic fora of the Internet."54 The court stated that the internet,
. . . provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds. . . 
. This dynamic, multifaceted category of communication includes not only traditional 
print and news services, but also audio, video and still images, as well as interactive, 
real-time dialogue. Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can 
become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any 
soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same 
individual can become a pamphleteer. As the District Court found, "the content of the 
Internet is as diverse as human thought."55
The Court also indicated that the internet was legally unique as compared to the major regulated 
media that had gone before. After briefly discussing a number of significant decisions dealing with 
the particular aspects of telephony, radio and television that justified the regulation of the content of 
those media, the Court stated that those cases ". . . provide no basis for qualifying the level of First 
Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to the Internet."56
These unequivocal statements make it clear that the United States Supreme Court expected freedom 
of expression to be taken very seriously on the internet. The Court would not tolerate content-
regulation that interfered with the potential of the medium to foster the development of the values 
enshrined in the First Amendment.
A.C.L.U. of Georgia v. Miller57 is one of the first cases to directly consider the issue of anonymity on 
the internet. It was decided in 1997, the same year as Reno, but without the benefit of the decision 
of the United States Supreme Court in that case. Miller seems to indicate that lower courts were 
reasoning in the direction of a right to anonymity online, even without the strong words of the 
Supreme Court.
The United States District Court found that a Georgia statute attaching criminal consequences to the 
act of anonymous or pseudonymous communication over the internet violated the First Amendment 
guarantee of free speech. In reaching its decision, the Court found that the statute was 
presumptively invalid on the basis that the identity of the speaker is no different from other aspects 
of a document's content that the author is free to include or exclude.58
While few decisions on the point are currently available, lower courts after Miller have not 




The Conflicting American Cases on Online Anonymity
    Columbia Insurance v. SeesCandy.com59
In 1999, the United States District Court considered a plaintiff's request for discovery of an I.S.P. so 
that the several John Doe defendants in the case could be identified. The anonymous defendants 
were accused of trademark infringement and dilution, unfair competition and trade practices, and 
unjust enrichment in relation to an alleged incident of "cybersquatting."60 The scenario placed the 
right to have one's day in court in direct conflict with the right to anonymity.
The Court first acknowledged that anonymous defendants can be a serious impediment to actually 
getting one's grievance heard. Judge Jensen stated, 
With the rise of the Internet has come the ability to commit certain tortious acts, 
such as defamation, copyright infringement, and trademark infringement, entirely 
online. The tortfeasor can act pseudonymously or anonymously and may give 
fictitious or incomplete identifying information. Parties who have been injured by 
these acts are likely to find themselves chasing the tortfeasor from Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) to ISP, with little or no hope of actually discovering the identity of the 
tortfeasor.
In such cases the traditional reluctance for permitting filings against John Doe 
defendants or fictitious names and the traditional enforcement of strict compliance 
with service requirements should be tempered by the need to provide injured parties 
with a forum in which they may seek redress for grievances.61 
Although First Amendment arguments were not explicitly raised,62 the Court anticipated the 
potential impact of its ruling on the right to anonymity on the internet: 
. . . this need [to seek redress] must be balanced against the legitimate and valuable 
right to participate in online forums anonymously or pseudonymously. People are 
permitted to interact pseudonymously and anonymously with one another so long as 
those acts are not in violation of the law. This ability to speak one's mind without the 
burden of the other party knowing all the facts about one's identity can foster open 
communication and robust debate. . . . People who have committed no wrong should 
be able to participate online without fear that someone who wishes to harass or 
embarrass them can file a frivolous lawsuit and thereby gain the power of the court's 
order to discover their identity.63
These are the same basic concerns for free speech and democratic participation that underlie the 
First Amendment arguments for a right to anonymity in Talley and McIntyre, discussed above. 
In an effort to balance the competing interests at stake in the case, the Court outlined a set of four 
procedural safeguards to ensure that discovery of the identity of defendants, 
. . . will only be employed in cases where the plaintiff has in good faith exhausted 
traditional avenues for identifying a civil defendant pre-service, and will prevent use 
of this method to harass or intimidate.64
First, the Court held, the plaintiff must identify the defendant with sufficient specificity to permit the 




Second, the plaintiff must identify all previous steps taken to locate the elusive defendant.66 The 
court stated that, 
This element is aimed at ensuring that plaintiffs make a good faith effort to comply 
with the requirements of service of process and specifically identifying defendants.67
Third, the plaintiff is required to satisfy the Court that the plaintiff's suit against the defendant could 
withstand a motion to dismiss. "A conclusory pleading will never be sufficient to satisfy this 
element."68 To prevent abuse of this procedure, the plaintiff, 
. . . must make some showing that an act giving rise to civil liability actually occurred 
and that the discovery is aimed at revealing specific identifying features of the 
person or entity who committed that act.69
Finally, the plaintiff must file a discovery request with the court, as well as a statement of reasons 
justifying the specific discovery requested. The request must include the names of a limited number 
of persons or entities on whom the discovery process might be served and for which there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the discovery process will lead to identifying information about the 
defendant that would make the service of process possible.70 
These procedural safeguards offer anonymous internet users significant protection, while also 
allowing courts to prevent the abuse of anonymity to perpetrate libel, fraud, and false advertising. 
This system balances the concerns for the protection of anonymity and protection from the abuse of 
anonymity articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Talley and McIntyre. 
    Hvide v. John Does 1-871
In May of 2000, a Miami-Dade Circuit Court judge considered the case of Hvide v. John Does 1-8.72 
The facts were similar to those in SeesCandy.com, but the court reached the opposite conclusion. 
The plaintiff, the former C.E.O. of Hvide Marine, alleged that he had been the subject of defamatory 
statements in online chat rooms.73 The chat rooms were dedicated to discussion of his company and 
were hosted by America Online and Yahoo!. Mr. Hvide had been granted subpoenas requiring A.O.L. 
and Yahoo! to divulge the identities of the online critics. The anonymous defendants brought a 
motion to quash the subpoenas, and their request was resoundingly denied.74 The court did not 
require the plaintiff to pass through the filter of the SeesCandy.com safeguards. Judge Shockett said 
in her oral decision, 
It sends the message, "You can have your say if it's responsible." . . . Give them 
anonymity and nothing holds them back. That's why the Ku Klux Klan wears 
hoods.75
While applications for subpoenas to identify defendants must often be considered ex parte, due to 
the nature of the issue of anonymity, this case was not. The decision was made in the face of 
extensive First Amendment arguments by both the anonymous defendants76 and the American Civil 
Liberties Union, acting as a friend of the court.77 While Hvide's precedential weight is limited by the 
fact that it was not subsequently published, it was upheld by the Court of Appeal of Florida, Third 
District,78 and represents a significant rebuke to proponents of a First Amendment right to 
anonymity on the internet. Further, it is a step back from the balance the SeesCandy.com 
safeguards struck between the right to online anonymity and the prevention of the abuse of 
anonymity. In Hvide, the scale weighs significantly in favour of unmasking defendants, whether or 
not the complaints against them have passed the barest test of their merits. 
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The decision in Hvide also indicates that until a higher court rules on the point it will be difficult to 
predict what protections will be granted to the identities of anonymous defendants on the internet 
generally, and in defamation cases specifically.
    Dendrite International v. John Does 1-1479
One additional American case considers an aspect of the procedure for divulging the identities of 
defendants that is not addressed in either SeesCandy.com or Hvide. 
Dendrite International v. John Does 1-1480 is typical of the cyberlibel scenario discussed above. A 
corporation filed a suit alleging that it had been the subject of defamatory statements by 14 
anonymous parties online, and that those parties had misappropriated trade secrets. The company 
sought to identify four of the defendants by serving the I.S.P. with a subpoena. 
Dendrite is unique in the case law in that the court recognized that anonymous defendants were not 
always aware that a John Doe suit had been launched against them and often did not send counsel 
to appear in their defence when the application to grant the subpoena was heard. By the very nature 
of an application to identify a defendant, it is clear that serving notice on the same defendant is a 
potentially difficult problem. The Court made an order to the defendants to appear and show cause 
why disclosure of their identities should not be granted. The I.S.P. was then ordered to post the 
order on the same message board where the allegedly defamatory statements had initially 
appeared.81 
Ordering the I.S.P. to post a message to its client in the forum in which the original statement 
appeared is an effective way to provide notice to the defendant to send counsel to defend his or her 
anonymous status without compromising that status in the process. In Dendrite, two of the four 
defendants appeared to defend their right to remain anonymous. The court applied the test from 
SeesCandy.com and found that the plaintiff did not pass the threshold of withstanding a motion to 
dismiss. 
Discussion 
     American versus Canadian protections of speech 
Canada and the United States have bestowed constitutional protection on freedom of expression and 
free speech, respectively. The existence of section 2(b) of the Charter and the First Amendment is a 
recognition of the value of public debate and expression. These similar protections are products of 
the strong democratic and pluralistic traditions of the two countries. While the Canadian and 
American political systems differ in many obvious ways, they share the core values of public debate 
and political participation that are at the root of the protection of free speech and freedom of 
expression. 
In Irwin Toy v. Québec (A.G.),82 Justice Dickson wrote, 
Freedom of expression was entrenched in our Constitution and is guaranteed in the 
Quebec Charter so as to ensure that everyone can manifest their thoughts, opinions, 
beliefs, indeed all expressions of the heart and mind, however unpopular, distasteful 
or contrary to the mainstream. Such protection is, in the words of both the Canadian 
and Quebec Charters, "fundamental" because in a free, pluralistic and democratic 
society we prize a diversity of ideas and opinions for their inherent value both to the 
community and to the individual.83 
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In Palko v. State of Connecticut,84 Justice Cardozo wrote for the United States Supreme Court, 
. . . neither liberty nor justice would exist if [the freedoms protected in the Bill of 
Rights] were sacrificed. This is true . . . of freedom of thought and speech. Of that 
freedom one may say that it is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly 
every other form of freedom.85 
These words were quoted by the Supreme Court of Canada in its discussion of s. 2(b) in Irwin Toy v. 
Québec86 and in the Court's judgment in R. v. Sharpe.87 Justice Cory wrote for the Supreme Court 
of Canada in Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (A.G.),88 
It is difficult to imagine a guaranteed right more important to a democratic society 
than freedom of expression. Indeed a democracy cannot exist without that freedom 
to express new ideas and to put forward opinions about the functioning of public 
institutions. The concept of free and uninhibited speech permeates all truly 
democratic societies and institutions. The vital importance of the concept cannot be 
over-emphasized.89
These examples show that the basic principles underlying the constitutional protection of freedom of 
expression in the United States and Canada are similar. Free speech or expression, which voices 
both popular and unpopular views on a diversity of subjects, is seen in both countries as part of the 
essential framework of the other constitutionally protected freedoms and of democracy itself. 
Despite this, it is clear that the two countries differ in the degree to which they protect this freedom. 
In Hill v. Church of Scientology,90 the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the higher, American 
standard of "actual malice" in defamation cases involving public officials.91 The Court found that 
freedom of expression must be balanced with the importance of individual reputation. Justice Cory 
wrote, 
I simply cannot see that the law of defamation is unduly restrictive or inhibiting. 
Surely it is not requiring too much of individuals that they ascertain the truth of the 
allegations they publish. The law of defamation provides for the defences of fair 
comment and of qualified privilege in appropriate cases. Those who publish 
statements should assume a reasonable level of responsibility.92
This practical view of the law of defamation is typical of the Supreme Court's approach to s. 2(b). 
Section 1 of the Charter93 has allowed courts to limit the extent of the right to free speech granted 
by section 2(b). A Court may consider the value of the particular speech at issue in a given case as it 
relates to the principles underlying s. 2(b). In Hill, Justice Cory discusses examples of cases 
involving hate speech and obscenity where the impugned legislation was found to be a reasonable 
limit on freedom of expression, despite violating s. 2(b). In those cases, he writes, the type of 
speech limited did not engage the core values underlying freedom of expression.94 The 
constitutionally protected freedoms in the U.S. Bill of Rights are not mitigated by a provision like s. 1 
of the Charter that allows the court to take the nature of the speech at issue into account. 
For these reasons, it may be correctly stated that s. 1 of the Charter fosters a more relativistic 
approach to the protection of fundamental freedoms in Canada than is the norm in the United 
States.95 
     Section 2(b) should include a right to speak anonymously.
http://cjlt.dal.ca
CJLT
The American jurisprudence discussed above indicates that the protection of a right to speak 
anonymously serves the same principles and is an inherent part of the right to free speech. These 
cases show that anonymity facilitates speech by people who might otherwise be silenced by fear of 
persecution for their unpopular views. Since the essential principles underlying American and 
Canadian speech protections are the same, there appears to be no reason why Canadian courts 
should not interpret s. 2(b) of the Charter as including a right to speak anonymously. 
In deference to this right, the merits of plaintiffs' defamation claims should be evaluated before 
courts are free to order discovery of a defendant's identity under provincial Civil Procedure Rules. 
Rules that do not impose such a hurdle risk divulging a defendant's identity as a result of non-
defamatory speech. If it is accepted that s. 2(b) includes a right to speak anonymously, a law 
allowing the unmasking of non-defaming speakers would clearly infringe the Charter right to 
freedom of expression.
The issue of justifying the infringement under s. 1 is a separate matter.96 It is acknowledged that 
rights under s. 2(b) are by no means absolute and are subject to contextual interpretation and 
balancing with competing rights and interests.97 However, since an application for discovery of a 
defendant's identity is necessarily made pre-trial, when the nature of the speech has not yet been 
determined, issues such as the degree to which defamatory speech advances the core values 
underlying the Charter protection of speech98 should not be taken into account. At the pre-trial 
stage, the court has determined no basis on which to mitigate the application of the Charter right. 
The American cases always turn to the history of anonymous speech in their arguments in favour of 
the right to speak anonymously. A number of writers who published under assumed names are 
mentioned in McIntyre, supra, including Samuel Clemens, better known as Mark Twain, Francois 
Marie Arouet, better known as Voltaire, and Benjamin Franklin who wrote under numerous 
pseudonyms.99 However, the writings of James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, under 
the collective pseudonym, "Publius," are the most often cited example.100 Their series of essays, 
known as "The Federalist Papers",101 published in several New York newspapers in 1787 and 1788, 
successfully campaigned for the ratification of the American Constitution. Madison went on to 
become president of the United States and is acknowledged as the Father of the Constitution, 
Hamilton was an important cabinet member and economist, and Jay was governor of New York and 
became the first Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.102 This compelling example 
makes the right to speak anonymously something of a sacred principle in American constitutional 
law. 
It is perhaps because Canada lacks such a touchstone that the arguments in favour of anonymity 
have not crossed the border. However, it is trite to say that persecution for unpopular or politically 
dangerous speech is not just an American phenomenon. Though they may be less numerous, 
Canada is not without its own examples. 
Joseph Howe, a Nova Scotia newspaper publisher, was charged with criminal libel in 1835 for 
printing an anonymous letter, written by someone else, which alleged corruption among the 
magistrates and police of Halifax.103 Despite the truth of what Howe had published, he had no legal 
defence, since he was charged with ". . . wickedly, maliciously and seditiously desiring and intending 
to stir up discontent among His Majesty's subjects."104 The issue was intent, not truth, and the 
judge informed the jury that even he believed Howe was guilty.105 Luckily for Howe, he escaped 
conviction as a result of his own rousing six-hour jury address full of rhetoric about freedom of the 
press. A lesser orator may well have been convicted. 
Numerous magistrates resigned following the Howe case.106 The acquitted publisher was elected to 
the provincial legislature the next year on a platform of reform and soon became Premier. Howe was 
charged for printing what many undoubtedly knew but were afraid to voice themselves. 
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While Howe's story is perhaps earthier than that of the "Federalist Papers", it shows that Canada has 
its own history of silencing constructive speech. Further, although anonymity is not as central to the 
Howe case as to the American story, it shows that writers in Canada have also had to remove their 
names from their work in order to escape persecution. 
The suggestion that Canada should follow the American example and interpret s. 2(b) of the Charter 
as including a right to speak anonymously is not a suggestion that Canada should raise its protection 
of speech or expression to the same level as the United States. On the contrary, Canadian courts 
should simply recognize that anonymity often facilitates valuable speech. 
In the context of a request for production of the identity of an anonymous defendant, the adoption of 
a test like the one in Irwin Toy would help to complete these protections, while also allowing 
Canadian defamation law and the balanced Charter approach to apply. The prima facie case 
requirement simply asks: Is a case likely to be made out on the relevant standard? The test is value 
free, and acknowledges the speaker's right to remain anonymous until it has been shown that he or 
she probably did something wrong. 
It is obvious that anonymity can be used to evade responsibility as well as to facilitate socially 
constructive speech. Justice Scalia, in his dissenting judgment in McIntyre, wrote that anonymity, 
. . . facilitates wrong by eliminating accountability, which is ordinarily the very 
purpose of the anonymity. . . . [T]o strike down the Ohio law in its general 
application . . . on the ground that all anonymous communication is in our society 
traditionally sacrosanct, seems to me a distortion of the past that will lead to a 
coarsening of the future.107
Justice Scalia's comments inject a dose of contemporary realism and compromise into what is often 
a discussion based purely on principle and America's revolutionary history. 
However, it must be recognized that an application to divulge the identity of a defendant in a 
defamation case for the purpose of service is always made before the primary issue is resolved. The 
Supreme Court of Canada has held that defamatory speech does not advance the core values 
underlying s. 2(b) of the Charter,108 but in the context of a pre-trial motion, the words at issue 
have not yet been proven defamatory. Thus, the speaker's right to anonymity should still be 
recognized. Since the type of speech remains unknown, the level of protection that different types of 
speech should receive must be seen as irrelevant to this kind of pre-trial issue. Such issues are 
properly considered only after the speech has been found to be defamatory. 
The above point goes to the heart of the argument for a right to remain anonymous in an online 
defamation case. As Justice Wilkins noted, 
. . . the fact of the anonymity of the internet could be shattered for the price of the issuance of a 
spurious Statement of Claim, and the benefits obtained by the anonymity lost in inappropriate 
circumstances.109 
Therefore, to prevent the abuse of the civil discovery process as a way to unmask critics who may be 
speaking the truth, or within the bounds of opinion or fair comment, there is a need to evaluate 
whether the speech at issue is defamatory before naming any names. The prima facie case 
requirement, discussed above, ensures that plaintiffs must have a real case before discovery is 
granted, while also preventing a right to anonymity from becoming a license to defame. Under this 
test, the right to speak anonymously does not facilitate wrong because it does not eliminate 
accountability. Since it is the actual words, and not who spoke them, that is at issue in making out a 
prima facie case of defamation, the continuing anonymity of the defendant does not present a 
significant hurdle to the plaintiff at this stage of the action. If the speech appears to be defamatory, 
the plaintiff will succeed on the application for discovery, and will not be denied redress by reason of 
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the defendant's anonymity. The adoption of the prima facie case requirement from Irwin Toy would 
avoid the "coarsening of the future" that Justice Scalia predicts.110 
     Additional Procedural Protections of the Right to Speak Anonymously 
While a prima facie case requirement is necessary to the protection of anonymity in defamation 
cases, it is not, in and of itself, sufficient. The tests applied in SeesCandy.com and Dendrite each 
supply additional, equally important elements. 
SeesCandy.com includes several elements similar to the procedure the Court applied in Irwin Toy. 
The requirement of surviving a motion to dismiss111 is analogous to the prima facie case 
requirement in Irwin Toy.112 The element of listing all steps taken to discover the identity of the 
defendant before requesting discovery mirrors the requirement in Ontario Civil Procedure Rules 
30.10 and 31.10, applied in Irwin Toy, of showing that the plaintiff was unable to obtain the 
information another way. Finally, the requirement that the plaintiff submit reasons justifying the 
discovery requested is similar to the element in Rules 30.10 and 31.10, applied in Irwin Toy, that the 
plaintiff show that it would be unfair to bring the matter to trial without first allowing discovery. 
In addition to these shared requirements, SeesCandy.com creates a unique burden on the plaintiff to 
identify the defendant with sufficient specificity to determine whether the court has jurisdiction to try 
the issue. The international nature of the internet means that jurisdiction is often the determinative 
issue in online defamation cases.113 Therefore, to avoid abuse of the discovery process, plaintiffs 
must also be required to prove jurisdiction before discovery of the defendant's name is granted. 
Jurisdiction is essential to the trial of any issue in the sense that it determines what law applies. For 
instance, a defamation case tried in Canada would certainly be subject to differently nuanced case 
law than one in the United States, and might be subject to completely different standards if the 
plaintiff was a public figure.114 Without first showing jurisdiction, it cannot be known whether the 
correct defamation standard is even being applied, or even whether the court has any power to 
compel the parties involved. 
Using the powers of the court to divulge the name of a defendant in a case where the court 
ultimately has no jurisdiction would be as unjust as allowing discovery where the plaintiff has no 
case on the facts. Requiring the plaintiff to prove jurisdiction before allowing discovery ensures that 
such an injustice would be avoided. 
Dendrite adds another useful element to the procedure. In that case, the court ordered the I.S.P. to 
give the defendants notice of the hearing on the discovery issue in the forum in which the alleged 
defamation occurred. Although, as noted above, several major I.S.P.s have chosen to give notice to 
their clients when they receive subpoenas requesting information on the clients' identities, it is 
submitted that this should be a requirement, not simply a voluntarily offered benefit. Further, notice 
after the subpoena is granted is not enough. Notice of the hearing to grant the subpoena would 
allow defendants to send counsel to defend their anonymity when the issue first arises, rather than 
shouldering them with the added burden of convincing the court to quash a decision already made. 
A posting in the online forum in which the alleged defamation occurred is not an infallible method of 
serving the defendant with notice of a hearing. The defendant may no longer use the chat room or 
bulletin board where the posting was made, and may thereby fail to receive notice of the hearing. In 
some cases the forum may no longer exist. On the other hand, since internet users operating under 
pseudonyms have knowingly made themselves difficult to find, it is reasonable to expect anonymous 
speakers to accept some of the burden of their nameless status. Such an approach would be in 
harmony with Canadian courts' balancing approach to competing rights under the Charter. Notice in 
the same forum in which the impugned speech appeared adequately accounts for both the right of 
the defendant to remain anonymous and the plaintiff's need to proceed with the action. 
     The Full Set of Procedural Protections 
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Drawing from Irwin Toy, SeesCandy.com and Dendrite, a full set of procedural protections can be 
suggested for the right to speak anonymously in defamation actions on the internet. It is submitted 
that the following procedure would be in harmony with the protection of freedom of expression set 
out in s. 2(b) of the Charter, and would not present unjustifiable or insurmountable impediments to 
the hearing of the plaintiff's defamation complaint. 
Before granting a plaintiff's request for discovery of an I.S.P. to determine the identity of the 
defendant, the Court must be satisfied that: 
(1) the plaintiff has been unable to find the information through other legal means at its disposal or 
from other parties it is entitled to discover; 
(2) it would be unfair to require the plaintiff to proceed to trial without the information requested; 
(3) the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case against the defendant on the allegation before the 
Court; 
(4) the plaintiff has identified the defendant with sufficient specificity for the Court to determine 
whether it has jurisdiction to hear the complaint; and 
(5) the plaintiff has attempted to give the defendant notice of the hearing by posting a message in 
the forum where the allegedly defamatory speech originally appeared. 
Conclusion
Although to date Canadian courts have not found that s. 2(b) of the Charter includes a right to speak 
anonymously, it is submitted that without such a finding the constitutional protection of freedom of 
speech remains incomplete. Basic democratic principles articulated in the decisions of the United 
States Supreme court, as well as compelling historical examples, indicate that the right to speak 
anonymously is an inherent part of a right to free speech or freedom of expression. While the 
question of whether s. 2(b) includes such a right has not yet been raised in a Canadian case, 
developments in the United States and Canada indicate that the issue will not be long in arising in 
the context of a defamation suit concerning speech on the internet. In online defamation cases 
where the defendant remains anonymous, a request for production of the defendant's identity from 
the I.S.P. is inevitable. 
The procedure described above accounts for the value of anonymous speech by ensuring that the 
civil discovery process cannot be abused to ascertain the identity of people engaging in legal and 
non-tortious speech. 
The first two parts of the test duplicate the requirements of Ontario Rules 30.10 and 31.10. They are 
essentially preliminary and merely ensure that discovery is not being used as a shortcut to obtain 
information otherwise available and that the information requested is necessary to the case. 
The prima facie case requirement, which is the central component of the procedure, requires that 
applicants must have a real case before they will be granted discovery. As well as acting as a brake 
on unjustifiable uses of discovery, this part of the test acknowledges the potential abuses of 
anonymity. Those who are legitimately subject to defamatory speech will be able to show a prima 
facie case and thereby discover the identity of the speaker and proceed with their action. The 
jurisdiction requirement is similar to the prima facie case step in that it also ensures that the 




The final requirement addresses the problem of notifying anonymous defendants of the request for 
discovery so that they may send counsel to appear at the hearing and defend their anonymous 
status. Posting notice in the forum where the allegedly defamatory speech originally appeared 
divides the burden of this problem between the plaintiff and defendant. While an imperfect method 
of giving notice, it acknowledges that by using an assumed name the defendant has knowingly made 
him or herself difficult to find, while also requiring that the plaintiff attempt to inform the defendant 
that a proceeding potentially affecting his or her rights is underway. 
These procedural steps balance the value of anonymity with the need for aggrieved parties to defend 
their reputations. They permit those who are engaging in legitimate speech to do so without fear of 
reprisal or persecution. The steps also allow plaintiffs to proceed with defamation actions when they 
have been subject to defamatory speech. 
Such a procedure is essential to adequately balance the interests at stake in an action for 
defamation against an anonymous online speaker. In the context of a request for discovery, a court 
order that divulged the identity of an anonymous speaker without first applying the procedural 
protections enumerated above would risk unmasking a speaker who had done nothing wrong. If such 
a court order were found to be made "pursuant to statute" it is submitted that it would violate the 
rights of the anonymous speaker under s. 2(b) of the Charter. However, regardless of whether the 
order was made "pursuant to statute," it would be out of step with an interpretation of Charter 
values that acknowledged the place of anonymity as an aspect of freedom of expression. 
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